Modern capitalism raises the flag of the free market while pitting centrally planned organizations against each other
It’s quite a journey from being born on a commune to raising more than $87m in funding at a software company. This journey forced me to wrestle with existential questions about my true beliefs, and how they intersected my life as an entrepreneur. One’s work is rarely a pure reflection of ideology, but companies need a clear and authentic strategy, which requires a tight alignment between company operations and the founder’s philosophy. I have discovered more about those differences between what I believe and the best ways to grow a corporation while studying economics - that is, how money is made and exchanged - than any other area.
A worldwide conflict between communism and capitalism defined the latter half of the twentieth century. The United States’ ideological battle was the central drama of my childhood, and it was with a combination of glee, pride, and “told you so!” that my fellow Americans watched the wall fall in Berlin, and the USSR dissolve shortly thereafter. I expect few would deny that the US is the standard bearer for capitalism.
Yet, there’s a flaw at the heart of this claim. While the United States operates as a free market economy, the key agent within modern capitalism - the corporation - works more like an authoritarian state. Given how much of our world is built around corporations, this truth and its impacts are critical.
I grew up apart from America’s passion for capitalism. In the era of Reagan, I was living on a commune. My parents did not earn money for their labor, and we didn’t have personal property. My family left the Farm when I was 8, and as I matured, my ideological roots were in conflict with the US’s nonstop pro-capitalism message. As I joined the workforce and eventually started my own company, I found myself attached to neither the communal roots of my childhood nor the Wolf of Wall Street world I moved into. I grew slowly in convictions, as I encountered problems in the course of scaling a company.
The first real conflict came when it was time to hire managers. I founded a company primarily because I did not thrive as someone else’s employee, so what led me to think others would? More importantly, anyone who has ever operated at the front line is aware of the severe costs imposed by the separation between the people who do the work and the people who make the decisions in hierarchies. Hiring managers was just going to make the company do worse, not better, right? Right?
I expect three of you are gleefully shouting, “Yay, holacracy!” right now, while the rest are confused and either offended or think I’m an idiot. I did consider a manager-less world, but a little research provided only examples of disaster, because the only available options just replace an explicit power structure with an implicit one. In other words, it’s still hierarchical with the founder on top, but now decision making is opaque and the system is easy to exploit because of the lack of controls (which looks surprisingly like the cult/commune I grew up in).
Those who are confused or offended by the idea that managers make performance worse would be informed by a deep dip in economics. One of the core principles of the free market is that central planning committees can never be as efficient or as effective as the people doing the work. By definition a free market economy lacks a decision-making hierarchy; the ‘free’ means every agent (individual or corporation) can decide for themselves, without needing permission from a manager above.
While there are many aspects of modern American capitalism I reject, this one I wholeheartedly support1. The downsides of a strong central executive were taught to me early.
Like many other communes, the one I grew up on routinely failed to feed its people - my parents speak with horror of the ‘wheat berry winter’, when we lived on little else. While his people were short on food, the founder of the Farm was off touring Europe as the 3rd drummer in a band, “bringing our message to the world”.
Thankfully none of us starved to death, but the failing was similar to what most communist countries experienced: The central organization could not feed everyone. For years, I assumed this was just incompetence, whether at the scale of the Farm or China. The truth was far more structural. Millions starved during the Great Leap Forward because the central organization was trying something impossible: Managing the productive output of an entire country. The Planet Money podcast tells a great story of how this central planning was walked back in China, but the general point here is that these communist countries did not just nationalize the means of production, they tried to centrally control all of it from within a small group.2
When people talk about communist countries not being a free market, this is what they mean: They tell the farms what crops to produce and in what quantity, rather than letting them decide for themselves. China even went so far as to dictate what hours a farmer should start and stop working, and then directed managers to ring a bell for transition times to control every little group of farmers. Anyone who’s ever had to punch a clock into a rigid, dysfunctional hierarchy is likely getting painful flashbacks about now.
It should be immediately obvious why this fails miserably: The distance between the central planning committee and the farmer is so great that good decisions are nearly impossible. It’s nearly impossible for critical feedback to make it from the edge, where the farmers are working, to the central planning committee in time to affect decisions, and then for those decisions to make it back to the edge in time to be useful. The podcast linked above also points out how unmotivated the farmers were under this regime, cutting productivity even further. Those who have studied lean manufacturing, agile development, and DevOps are likely seeing parallels here.
The result was catastrophe. When a corporation is painfully inefficient it loses money and might have to do layoffs, but when a country fails at growing food, its people starve to death. I don’t mean to imply that central planning was the only cause of famine under communist rule - there were political operations that led to mass starvation, just like in the West - but learning more about these helped crystallize what I do truly prefer about capitalist models. It also converted the phrase ’the free market’ from a catchy slogan into something meaningful to me.3
The most important feature of free market economies is that each person within them is able to make independent decisions in their own best interests4. If you’re a farmer, you can decide what to grow, how much to grow, and when to work to develop your crop. Heck, you can even choose not to be a farmer any more. Success is merely dependent on your finding a buyer for your work at a price you can tolerate. Any given year might not be perfect, but your decision making gets better over time as you learn to respond to customer demand.
This pattern is easy to understand in any system where the people doing the work make the decisions. If you’re a jeweler, you can decide what to make, how much to sell it for, and what to spend your time on. Same if you run a small restaurant, lead local tours, or are a one-person shop doing house remodeling. It’s a free market, where you can charge what the market will bear, and you can quickly and efficiently respond to its whims, ensuring that you are getting the best use of your time.
This was a powerful organizing principle for a long time. The history of human commerce developed largely this way: One person, or as many people as could fit in one shop, would turn labor into a product, then find a buyer for it. Most large-scale efforts were organized by the state of the time: Monarchs and the landed gentry, who were the only ones capable of marshaling enough resources to build palaces, roads, and other large construction projects.
This began to change in the 17th century when corporations like the Dutch East India Company were able to deliver massive windfalls to investors by pooling money and using it to extract resources from colonies. There was a step change in the 19th century, as corporations went from generating wealth to building and owning infrastructure. It’s one thing to outfit a single ship for a year-long voyage, yet another to maintain railroad schedules across the United Kingdom, or run a telegraph network around the whole US. These aren’t just short-term money-making exercises, they’re long-term commitments with big capital outlays and large returns over years and years.
We still live in a free market economy, but it’s not one Adam Smith would recognize. Instead of individual or small operators, ours is composed almost entirely of corporations. Really big corporations. And these companies, they use the same kind of central planning that we so despise in communist systems. I know. I’ve done it.
By the time my company got near 500 people, we had a multi-week planning process, where the leadership (i.e., me and my lieutenants) set out top-level goals, built a top-down plan to accomplish them, then drew information from the front line to see where it needed change. We called this a bottom-up plan, but it was only bottom-up from the perspective of numbers - how much money we’d have, what our costs were, etc. - rather than from the bottom of the organization. We could see no way to have a system where the people doing the work built a plan for the organization. Even thinking about it now, my reaction is, “How would they know what my goals are?”
That’s the kind of question you can only ask in an authoritarian state, not in a free market economy. My goals became my company’s goals, and the only real way to ensure people worked toward them was providing a plan. You might argue that a corporation should focus on shareholder value, but that doesn’t help make decisions about what the company should actually do.
Great leaders find a way to listen to everyone in the company, but in the end, leadership is about making decisions. That’s essentially the definition of the word. And we all know leaders who did not bother to listen, or just did not need to in order to be great; today’s most vaunted tech leader, Steve Jobs, was famously disrespectful of the opinions of others, yet made a lot of world-changing decisions (not all for the better).
This is exactly why working in a big corporation is so stifling. If you’re in a small company, the executives are close enough to the front line that it’s more like working in a tribe, but in a big company, the leadership is so removed from whose who do the work that executive teams operate like the politburo we so decry in communist countries. Certainly the bureaucracies are no more enjoyable or forgiving.
I find it both ironic and painful that my inability to work for someone else resulted in my creating a company that involved a lot of smart, capable people working for someone else.
I wish I had a solution. If this were an easy problem, its solution would already be pervasive, because the benefits are massive. Just in terms of efficiency, we’ve seen how much better the free market is than planned economies, but it also has a hugely positive impact on quality of life. People are happier when they’re in control.
I know the solution is not more freelancing and contract work, which America’s corporations are addicted to. That’s the worst of both worlds: The exploitative nature of capitalism with the inefficient bureaucracies of communism. Transactions on the free market work because they’re good for both sides, but most people only accept part-time contract relationships today when they have no other real choices.
Holacracy certainly isn’t the answer. It’s fundamentally flawed because of its implicit power structure - Tony Hsieh still runs Zappos, even if he does not use a central planning committee to do it - but the biggest problem is it makes no mention of economics. Without a clear system for scoring the transactions (i.e., money) it’s impossible to build a free market.
This problem of how to handle economics within a non-hierarchical company might lead some to think of using blockchain tokens as an internal currency. This is impossible today, beyond the fact that the world of blockchain is mostly about fraud and black market sales. The biggest problem is that we have no idea how to value most of the work people do. I mean, we might know that what a developer should get paid for a year’s work, but how much is that work worth? The majority of the work done in modern corporations is incredibly hard to value, which is partially why companies are so inefficient and make so many bad decisions.
That brings up an even bigger problem - companies today hire workers to make money from their labor. In other words, they generate profit because they pay their employees less than they’re worth. If everyone could trade their labor for exactly the amount of money it was worth, the corporations that employ them would have a much harder time making money. Instead, in modern corporations the shareholders and the executive team - again, the central planning committee we so despise - make the majority of the money, while the front line does all the work and makes very little. This is true even at the big tech firms; software developers might be well paid relative to hotel workers, but they’re paid a pittance compared to the founders and executives. This might speak to why we have no solution yet - free market corporations would tend to reduce concentrations of wealth, which would be terribly disruptive to the current system.
Like I said, I don’t have a solution. But at least now I know what makes the current system so painful, and it gives me some hope that we actually can come up with a better answer. I know I’ll be working harder in the future to manage the downsides of what we have today.
Although I might stress the “well regulated” part more than most modern economists. ↩
The arrival of the smartphone has convinced the world of the value of great software design, but it’s not all good news
The smartphone has reached more people and delivered more value faster than any technology ever seen. Much of the world has had to adapt to this arrival, but software design suffered the greatest reckoning. As the smartphone ascended, developers finally adopted reasonable design principles, realizing that they could not pack every feature ever seen into the smartphone experience. This recognition of the value of design - and especially, minimal design - is a good thing. Mostly.
I could not be happier that the industry finally accepts that there are principles of design, and there is a practice and discipline behind building great software. It’s great that we’re seeing more focused software that does little, but does it very well, rather than the previous age of the GUI when software attempted to own large parts of our lives by doing anything and everything. For a long time, Microsoft Word was used by nearly everyone who had a computer, and their strategy was to ensure no one ever had a reason to choose something else by building every feature anyone might ever need; their toolbar was the canonical example of never saying no.
The smartphone changed all that. Those rows of icons would fill the screen on a phone and leave no room for typing, and of course, no one would use them anyway because of how different the usage patterns are. As people realized they could no longer just throw in the kitchen sink, they began hiring (and listening to!) actual designers, and those designers have been steeped in the culture of Dieter Rams and the minimalism of the Bauhaus movement, which is awesome. Mostly.
Unfortunately, the phone caused everyone to focus on the final design principle of Dieter Rams (“Good design is as little design as possible”), without apparently remembering the nine that came before it, or why they were earlier in his list. I get it; the design constraints in a phone are intense, and it might not be a good idea to minimize everything, but it sure is easy.
The consequence of this mobile brutalism is a new movement building simpleton tools: Software that anyone can use, but no one can become an expert in.
Trello is a great example. I adore Trello. I think it’s great software, and it’s clearly a success by any measure. However, for all that I’ve relied on Trello daily for years, I feel no more an expert than I did just after starting to use it. It’s not because I haven’t tried; it’s because there’s no depth. You can pretty much plumb the product in a couple of days.
That’s fantastic for getting new users up to speed quickly, but deeply frustrating after a couple of weeks. Or months. Or years. Compare that with Vim, which I still use for all of my code editing, yet it’s so complicated that most people don’t even know how to quit it, much less use it. I’m not going to claim its lack of user friendliness is a feature, but I will defend to the death that its complexity is.
Apple’s Notes is the ultimate expression of this trend in text editor form. It’s a fine text editor. I know some people have written huge, impressive programs in similarly simplistic editors like Notepad on Windows. But I personally could not imagine giving up keyboard navigation, selection, text munging, and everything else I do. The fact that complicated work can be done on simplistic tools speaks to the value of having them, but in no way invalidates the need for alternatives. Yet, on the current trends, no one will even be trying to build this software I love because they couldn’t imagine two billion people using it on a smartphone.
I think it’s fair to say that that’s an unfair standard, and even a damaging one.
I miss the rogue-esque exploration that tool mastery entails. It’s not that I want tools to be hard; I want them to be deep. I want to never run out of ways to invest in my tools. I don’t want to have to swap software to get upgrades, I want to upgrade my understanding instead.
But I look around my computer, and everything on it was designed for the “average” user. I was not average as a CEO with 40+ hours of meetings a week while receiving more than 200 emails a day, nor am I average now as someone who spends more time writing than in meetings. There’s no such thing as an average user, so attempting to build for one just makes software that works equally poorly for everyone.
It is a rookie mistake to conflate the basic user who will never plumb the depths of their tools with the expert user who will learn every nook and cranny of your software. It is a mistake to treat the person who sometimes has to solve a problem the same as a person who spends 80% of their time working on that problem.
I don’t want to be an expert in all of my tools - for all that I take thousands of photos a year, I don’t think I’m up for switching to Adobe Lightroom - but for those tools that I spend the most time in, that most differentiate me, I want the opportunity for true expertise. And I’d happily pay for it.
Back in the days when computer screens were tiny, there were plenty of stats that showed that paying for an extra screen would often give people a 10% or more boost in productivity. I know it did that for me. As a business owner, it was trivial to justify that expense. Monitors cost a lot less than 10% of a person’s salary, and don’t need to be replaced every year. Heck, the whole point of the automation company I built was to allow people to focus their efforts on the most valuable work they could do.
Yet, when it comes to software being built and purchased today, to the tools we use on a daily basis, somehow our software ecosystem is failing us. There is no calendar I can buy that makes me 10% better, no email client available that I can spend five years getting better at.
It’s great that people are finally making software that everyone can use, but that’s no excuse to stop making software for specialists, for experts, for people who could get the most advantage from that extra 10%.
In an industry built around investing large sums in uncertain ventures, the best companies seek out the best investors, and gains accumulate at the top. Part 3 in a series.
Investing in software companies is inherently an uncertain activity. It’s called high risk, but highly uncertain is a better label. Yes, you’re taking a risk with money, but the real problem is the widely variant potential outcomes. If you invest in a restaurant, you are taking a risk but you will pretty much end up with a profitable restaurant, or lose your money. If you invest in a software company, you can go bankrupt, have a small but profitable company, sell for five times the money in, or end up with a world-spanning multi-billion dollar behemoth that turns everyone it touches into a millionaire. That dramatic range is why you can get a bank loan to start a restaurant but not a software company. It’s exactly why people invest in software, but also why it’s so difficult to do well.
There’s no proven method for managing that uncertainty. The most successful investors frequently get it massively wrong, and a playbook that worked perfectly in one circumstance falls flat on its face in so many others. Yet, even when they frequently make monumentally bad investments, the best investors keep delivering the best outcomes. If no one knows what separates the best from the rest, how can some firms or individuals keep winning?
Of course, many would disagree with my claim, they would say the best keep winning because they can tell a great company from a bad one, but if you look at the trends in venture capital you can see the industry as a whole has given up on a clear system, even if individuals still cling to deserving their greatness. Fantastically successful investor Paul Graham once said that he can be tricked by anyone who looks like Mark Zuckerberg. He’s since claimed that was a joke, but he built his empire by making more bets than anyone else, which is a strategy explicitly designed around the fact that he doesn’t actually know why some things succeed and others don’t. Disgraced investor Dave McClure started 500 Startups with the similar goal of just making lots of bets, rather than making any attempt at making “good” bets.
Even those who invest in venture capital firms have given up on knowing who’s best. Given a pot of money allocated to VC, limited partners will distribute it across many firms, knowing that they have to play many hands to get a winner. After all, the industry average return for venture funds is, ah, absolutely nothing. The winners win big, and the rest balance that out, so LPs need to put money in enough places to be confident they end up with the winners.
If no one knows the difference between the best and the worst, why do the winners usually keep winning?
Access.
Venture capital is all about access: Founders having access to capital, and investors having access to the best deals. If you’re a founder today and you have a choice between taking money from a top-tier firm that keeps delivering hits, or another firm you don’t know and who hasn’t done well, which do you take? Of course you take the best firm with the biggest network and most well-known brand name.
Similarly, if you’re an investor who’s helped take lots of companies public, how does your deal flow compare to those who are just starting out and who don’t have a reputation for building big companies? Of course the best companies come to you.
In other words, there’s an implicit matching algorithm, where companies that are obviously doing really well are able to work with what look like the best firms, and as a result they are able to reinforce each other’s success. The best firms look better because the best companies seek them out, and the best companies do better because they’re getting the chance to work with the best brands. (For all that I am skeptical of repeatable investment skill, I am a deep believer in the value of brands.)
Venture capital is defined by the asymmetric stresses pressed on investors and founders by the need for access; every entrepreneur stresses over how they’ll get access to capital, and every investor’s business model is built around managing deal flow. Entrepreneurs who already had a great outcome magically have no trouble raising huge amounts of money, and yesterday’s great investors have no trouble convincing today’s great companies to work with them.
This focus on access also helps to explain some of the churn the system experiences. If no one knows what makes a great company, how can the best investors always get access? They can’t. There are plenty of great companies that fail to get first-tier support early on. If they do raise money, then those who backed them end up looking like tomorrow’s geniuses, and the cycle starts over with them closer to the top.
This access-based sorting also helps to explain how the VC industry is so discriminatory. Less than 5% of investments go to women-led companies, and just having a woman founder ruins a team’s chance of getting funding , and the numbers are as bad for firms led by African Americans, for example. If we believed investors actually knew what they were doing, then we could only conclude that they were correct to exclude women and minorities from investments, that these founders just couldn’t build great companies.
Of course, the data clearly says otherwise: Founding teams with women on them significantly outperform male-only teams. Because investors don’t know how to pick a good company from a bad one, they are relying on access and reputation, and because they’ve never let women or minorities in before, they can’t now. Their “pattern matching” doesn’t hit here.
This matching algorithm that runs our industry is reliant on privilege and luck. Venture firms and founders are almost exclusively white men from expensive schools (with a huge proportion from just Stanford and Harvard), and if you were lucky enough to be an early employee at Facebook or Google (who have historically used the same sourcing requirements), then that’s a big leg up, too.
To be clear, I think some investors are much better than others, and entrepreneurs haven’t built huge, successful businesses out of sheer coincidence. It’s not that there’s no skill involved, or that the people who get so rich instead deserve nothing. It’s that skill is an over appreciated (and often small) part of what determined their success.
You will rarely find communities admitting that privilege and luck are what determine outcomes. Human nature itself has a deep aversion to accepting this. Instead, we do what humans have done forever: We develop myths.
Humans deeply believe that people get what they deserve, and deserve what they get, despite the evidence to the contrary. So many of our cultural biases are a story created to justify a reality we would like to perpetuate. For millennia we’ve been told that royalty was special, and that’s why they were in charge, when it was patently obvious that their ancestors were just the best and most ruthless at organizing enough troops to control a chunk of land. Genghis Khan was history’s greatest murderer, which enabled him to spawn kings and kingdoms that lasted for seven centuries, but you can bet his descendants didn’t use his skills at genocide as justification for their lofty positions.
Similarly, myths have grown around venture capital exist to explain the winners and losers. Somewhat like royalty, these myths help convince us that VC is more than privileged people using their positions to make lots of money. They must be winning because they deserve to win. Equivalently, people lose because they didn’t deserve to win. You could waste your life reading about how this founder got rich because they were smart and worked hard, or that investor succeeded because of their investment strategy, but you couldn’t consume a whole morning with the stories of equally smart founders who worked just as hard but went broke, or investors who applied that same strategy but somehow didn’t make it on the Midas list.
With these and related efforts, I’m optimistic that we can begin to peel back the myths about what makes a great investor, entrepreneur, or company, and instead begin building a more open market around investment and company creation. Only then can we hope to see venture capital include, enrich, and benefit all parts of the economy.
It’s time to develop new sources of capital for founders, to help them generate wealth through solving their customer problems without the massive failure rate. Part 7 in a series.
The venture capital world that funds the technology ecosystem appears to be specially designed to back the best founders working on the economy’s most important problems. This series has shown that it has instead evolved over time, with no higher purpose in mind than any other financial instrument.
This evolution is in many ways a strength, as by definition it is built on the successes of the past, but it leaves our ecosystem more blind than we realize. We can fear the fragility this engenders, but should instead see it as an opportunity to reach beyond its artificial limitations, to solve hidden or devalued problems. Technology funding’s demonstrated ability to change should give us confidence we can stretch it further, clearing new paths to success.
Wikipedia covers the history of venture capital better than I could, but it’s worth highlighting key epochs. The system as we know it was birthed by the windfalls from early funding wins, including DEC and Fairchild Semiconductor, so by definition there was no technology funding system in place at that point. Every deal involved people flying around the US collecting enough money to back a new venture.
These early big successes motivated a few people in the west to set up firms dedicated to funding technology companies — prior to this, the vast majority of American capital was in New York. Within a couple of decades, partially enabled by some regulatory changes in the US, there were enough firms around (including modern heavy hitters like Sequoia and Kleiner Perkins) that we had what felt like the first stable system, which of course led to over-investment and the first pull-back in the late 1980s.
What survived went on to fund the internet boom in the 90s, when a huge amount of wealth was created (and then destroyed) and this new ecosystem first made it into the public consciousness. Much of what we believe about venture capital comes from those days, but it was still changing quickly, with no seed funds, relatively small amounts of funding for software companies, and no obvious pattern of success.
Right now, the system looks dangerously stable. There are hundreds of seed and venture funds, all following the same playbook: Try to get their investments to the magic number of $1m in annual recurring revenue (ARR), raise an A round of funding, and keep on the funding train until you go public or go bust. There’s so much pattern matching going on that founders are contorting their companies to fit the funding schedule rather than discovering their destiny.
It’s important to recognize that this appearance of stability is a recent arrival. We might tell a story of how it’s a natural consequence of previous eras of success, but much of current best practice is cargo culting, copying the behaviors of the successful rather than understanding what made them work. If you step back even a little to gain perspective on the industry, you quickly see how much the system is still changing, and still needs to.
Don’t get me wrong: the system we have works. It is, essentially, functioning as intended, and any ideas or recommendations need to take into account not just what we dislike, but what makes it work. I hope this series has educated you somewhat both on how VC works, and why it works that way. As usual, when we dig deeper we find no villain at the heart of a web; we might not love venture capital, but it makes sense, and it works this way for good reason. And indeed, the system is working very well for a few people, and in the process is driving huge change in our economy and lives.
As much as the system of venture capital makes sense, we must ask: What sits outside? The industry generates money through positive feedback loops, but absence from the industry is merely an indication that something hasn’t worked, not that it can’t. What are we missing by doubling down on what we know, instead of exploring the unknown?
Investors are reliant on people near them, who resemble them, and who can absorb the weighty downsides of entrepreneurship. We’ve seen that investors don’t really know what separates great companies from bad in the early days, so they don’t strive to create the conditions necessary for gestation, and once a company is started, they do little for the winners and even less for those who fail. But don’t worry, all of this is hidden by the massive profits that the biggest winners generate for the top-performing investors, and the rest of the industry (while failing to meet its investment return goals) glides along in the afterglow.
(To think I was asked recently if I had become cynical about venture capital.)
It’s a funny thing. I grew up a communist (literally, on a commune) but have become a pretty big fan of well-regulated open markets (although they seem to exist only in theory; in practice we have lost the taste for effective regulation). A self-respecting capitalist can and should argue that this is a market, and it’s performing exactly as it should. I can hear it now: “Capitalism is inherently Darwinian, where evolution gives all prizes to the winners and the losers don’t live long enough to make it into the archeological records.”
It’s a fair point. Humanity can afford stretch goals like less collateral damage than the battle for life and death on the savannah, but we could ask for better even without that ideal. It took millions of years for nature to come up with the Dodo, only for it to promptly die off once it encountered outside species. How convinced are we that our apparently stable system is any more safe from an outside force?
The ultimate weakness in the Capitalist defense of venture capital is that for all the apparent competition we have a homogenous system. Shouldn’t we have multiple types of funding competing for the best companies and the best outcomes? That is, not competition between VCs who all work the same, but competition between different funding strategies?
Because there is no open market here. At best we have a dysfunctional oligopoly (is there any other kind?) with some churn at the top. For all the talk of disruption, everyone is trying to win by copying the winners, rather than seeking to disrupt them. The only people willing to step outside the current system are those who don’t have a choice because they aren’t allowed to succeed within it. Unsurprisingly, they find it challenging to compete not with another investor but with a whole system of funding.
As just one example, the most common barrier I hear to starting a new kind of venture capital is that the limited partners — that is, those who invest in the venture capital funds — would not be willing to support a new kind of capital. This is a perfect example of an ecosystem limitation, rather than a problem with individual players. I hear no argument that founders, employees, and customers don’t want competitive models; only that the source of capital would need to be educated, and that’s just too hard. Except… this whole industry is only a few decades old, and its creation required that same kind of education. Why should we expect a new kind of financing to be any easier to start, require any less systemic change, than the one we’re fighting against? And isn’t it ironic that an industry built on stories of disruption finds the idea just too hard for its own work?
That competition will show up eventually, though. We need it. There are too many software markets lying fallow, unfundable in the current model and thus deemed to be of no value. Someone will figure out how to finance those companies. And just as the first winners in venture were big winners indeed, the first few investors to step out of this world into a new one should make out like the oligarchs who laid the groundwork for our current world.
I’ve said before I don’t have the solution, but there are some market truths give me confidence there are better answers available:
The best way to make money is to hold high quality assets for a long time. If nothing else, Warren Buffett has demonstrated this is both the best way to make money and indefinitely scalable.
The majority of employment and wealth generation is provided by companies too small or too closely held to be public.
The steady state of good companies is cash-flow generation managed by long-term teams who take pride in their work. This is literally the entire history of for-profit enterprises. Any other solution must either fail or revert to this at some point.
None of these realities show up in modern venture capital. Companies can’t run on venture capital forever (although try telling that to Uber), and do usually need to show a profit to be sustainable (I expect Amazon begs to differ), but the companies that do either of these are explicitly leaving the world of venture capital.
It’s unquestionable that the financing structure of venture capital is tied in to this separation from market principles. The risky software companies we build today are funded via a structure invented to support the risky ventures of the 19th century: whaling. Suddenly the term ‘venture’ in venture capital makes more sense, doesn’t it? (Tragically, even though it was the days of slavery, those whaling fleets had better representation in some ways than current tech companies, with up to 20% of their employees being African American. Wow.)
We’re using an incentive structure that works perfectly to support individual voyages that might last a couple of years. Is it any surprise it is not great at building companies that last for decades, or have a high survival rate? In fact, whaling had a better survival rate than current venture capital, with more than 80% of the fleet surviving, and delivered better returns (14% IRR on average, and 60% IRR for the best). The funding perfectly matched the ventures.
I should not need to say this, but whaling is unlike company building. It’s unrelated to developing a product, it has nothing to do with creating a new market. It’s inanity to expect a funding mechanism built for one would work as well for the others. The fact that it’s making some people rich, and it hits a jackpot once in a while, should not confuse us.
Venture capital’s apparent stability convinces me it’s at its most vulnerable. Instead of continuing to fund disruptors, I think it will itself be disrupted.
If you’re a founder given a choice between a firm that kills most of its customers and one with demonstrated success at creating long-running companies that generate wealth for everyone involved, why would you pick venture capital? The only reason you do today is because it’s your only option.
Founders want this competition right now. Some want to build Facebook, but most want to build a great company, help their customers by solving a critical problem, and hope to get rich along the way. They don’t want a lottery ticket; they want upward mobility, entrepreneurial fulfillment, and to feel like they made a difference. Unfortunately, low-probability gambling is all the venture world sells.
The new models will start at companies run by women and people of color, because they’re the ones shut out of the current system, but as they start to succeed, they will start to pressure to rest of venture capital, and we will see just how stable the system really is.
I have tried in this series to help you understand not just what venture capital is, but that what you love and hate about it are intrinsic to how it works. I hope this deeper knowledge will help you make higher quality decisions about how to involve yourself in this world. Even more so, I hope it convinces you to seek out, or even create, other ways of funding companies, other ways of building them.
It’s time for founders to have truly competitive options for funding. Let’s go make it happen.
Software has the potential to increase productivity as much as electrification or steam power did, but its impact is stunted by its reliance on random interactions. Part 6 of a series.
The venture capital ecosystem bills itself as a meritocratic miasma of genius, with smart founders getting smart money from smart investors. In reality, there is an overwhelming reliance on privileged people bumping into each other at just the right time. This serendipity has spawned some great companies:
Warby Parker was started because someone in an elite graduate program lost an expensive pair of glasses.
Apple was started by a couple of guys who met at a hobbyist group in the computer heartland.
Google’s founders met when one of them gave a tour to the other when he arrived at Stanford for a CS graduate program.
But how many great problems are being ignored because we didn’t get that lucky alignment of particles?
The remodeling industry is a perfect example. It’s an 83 billion dollar market, yet it’s only now starting to see software solutions. The industry itself bemoans neglect by the software industry. The article linked above has some impressive stats about how much waste they experience:
“…studies suggest 30 percent of the construction process is re-work, 60 percent of labor is wasted, and only ten percent of losses are due to wasted materials”
Shouldn’t there be companies fighting tooth and nail over that market? Shouldn’t there be tons of solutions out there, spending money like Uber and Blue Apron are to acquire new customers and take a cut of the productivity gains?
Yet I’m in the late-stages of having a garage built at my house, and as far as I can tell software was only used during design, not actual production. One of the contractors we considered seemed to be an Excel wiz, but wasn’t using off-the-shelf software. How many months of productivity could have been added back into these teams’ lives if they had better tools? How much less disruption could I have experienced, and even, how much less could I have paid if my contractor could get three jobs done in this time because she was so much more productive?
(Did you notice that even I’m relying on the serendipity of my building a garage to illustrate my point that VC relies too much on it?)
In a rational world, every reasonably sized market would have a well-funded ecosystem of software companies vying to take it into the information age. When I got my home equity loan for the garage, I should have been inundated with offers from software companies to help improve the project. Heck, someone should have offered me the loan interest-free if only I required my contractor use their software. Instead, my project is late, costs me more, and makes less money for all the workers because it’s left out of the information technology revolution.
And that’s just one industry, chosen at coughrandomcough. What about all of the other industries the software kings have not yet anointed as worthy, filled with deeply skilled and energetic experts who aren’t lucky enough to run in the right circles, or live in the right zip codes?
Venture investors famously want passion for the problem they’re investing in solving, so much so that the companies also then demand that any employees also be passionate in turn. And we want our software companies started by developers, by product people, not by business analysts. Or carpenters.
So now to start a company you’ve got to have a software developer thrilled about and experienced in a problem, able to accept the risks that come with starting a company (e.g., health insurance and wage loss), who is living in or can move to San Francisco, and hopefully is a white dude who went to Harvard or Stanford. One way to look at that is how discriminatory it is, but another way is just how much you’re relying on everything lining up just right. It might be that you’ll find a Stanford-educated software developer who deeply cares about building houses and can take the leap into entrepreneurship. But what are the odds that that person has the right insight at the right time, and then can find the right people to partner with?
Twenty years in I’m still awed by the opportunity for software to connect, educate, and empower people, but I’m incredibly disappointed by how little of that opportunity we’re progressing against. I think our inappropriately slow revolution is in large part thanks to this reliance on randomness. We have got to get past this if we truly want to get the most out of software before the heat death of the universe (coming more quickly now with all the power being consumed to mine bitcoin). If we can build an environment that does not use serendipity as a crutch, I am convinced we can generate more great companies, and importantly these companies can cover a broader swathe of the economy, and be run by a more representative sample of the market.
Let’s look to biology to see how much of a difference shifting to a constructed environment can make. Living creatures are full of enzymes, which are basically proteins that speed up the rate of a reaction. These reactions are critical to the function of the organism, and without the enzymes speeding them up, life as we know it could not exist. (Conveniently, I did my senior thesis at Reed College on protein structure, so I’ve got some knowledge here.)
In most cases, the reaction that they catalyze (that is, cause to happen) would happen without the enzyme, but it would do so at a far slower rate. For instance, mammalian milk contains the sugar lactose. This sugar will break down in water into glucose and galactose of its own accord, but not quickly enough to digest all the lactose in milk you drink. Mammals have evolved the enzyme lactase, which causes this splitting of lactose into simpler sugars to happen much faster.
Enzymes are incredibly complex — lactase has 1927 amino acids in five separate groups, arranged in an amazing 3D structure:
A rendering of the structure of lactase
This huge structure is all necessary to enable the protein to place a lactose molecule near a water molecule in exactly the right arrangement to ensure the reaction happens immediately, every time, instead of eventually, sometimes. For all this structure, the site where the reaction takes place is quite small, just big enough for the two target molecules. Those 1927 amino acids mean the protein is about 37,000 atoms. Lactose is 35 atoms, and water is, ah, 3.
That’s a lot like designing a building the size of a sports stadium just to catalyze a meeting of two people.
How much quicker does the enzyme work? About 75% the world’s human population is lactose intolerant, meaning that if they drink milk as an adult, the lactose will cause adverse reactions instead of safely being broken down in the intestines. The rest express enough lactase that they are able to comfortably metabolize lactose, and thus can drink as much milk as they want. Again, remember that lactose breaks down in water on its own, just too slowly to be useful.
So here we have a situation where one of the major sources of calories around the world — cow’s milk — is enabled by this enzyme dramatically speeding up reaction rate.
What does this have to do with venture capital?
Again, venture today is heavily reliant on serendipity; that is, the right people bumping into each other at the right time in the right context. This is exactly how chemical reactions happen normally: Two molecules (e.g., lactose and water) live near each other, and every so often they bump into each other in a way that enables the reaction to happen. Most of the time, however, they fail to hit exactly the right setup, and nothing happens.
When the enzyme is present, though, its unbelievably complex structure ensures that the water and lactose molecules are placed into exactly the right orientation every time, and bam, magic happens.
The probability of a great company getting founded today is a lot like the probability of lactose degrading naturally: It happens, but slowly and infrequently.
I smile at the idea of complexes the size of sports stadiums built for speed-dating founding teams, but that’s not necessarily what I’m recommending here (although if that’s your plan, I’d love to consult on the project).
Even if we wanted to, I don’t think we could build a structure (physical or otherwise) like this, because we don’t yet understand yet what it takes to build a great software company, which means we can’t construct or evolve a perfect environment in which to make it happen.
All I really know is that what we’re doing now isn’t working. We’re not attacking the right markets, we’re not including enough people, and we’re not having a big enough impact on the economy.
For our ecosystem to be healthy, for it to be effective at transforming the industries that need it most, it has to do something differently. We can really only increase the rate of great company creation by increasing the rate of experimentation, or increasing the rate of success. Incubators and early stage investors are doing what they can to run more attempts in parallel, somewhat like a generative algorithm, but this is bound to have little impact because the goals — “be worth a billion dollars” — are so separate from the founding event. Investors are starting to figure this out and pull efforts back accordingly.
That leaves us the challenge of finding ways to increase the rate of success.
Of course, I have my own ideas for doing so, but I was always told as a leader my job was to present the challenge to the team and leave the problem of solving it to them.
Venture capital’s reliance on unicorns provides cover for the huge failure rate of startups, and investors make no effort to reduce it. Part 5 of a series
Venture investing is fundamentally uncertain. You’re making big bets on people, ideas, and markets that might never work out, and there are more ways to fail than succeed. As a result, investing has to take into account the likely failure of many efforts. If your financial model assumes each of your investments will be a success, you will have a short career indeed.
Manyinvestors have written about how they need some companies to win big in order to cover for other companies failing completely. As a simple example, Fred Wilson at Union Square Ventures tells his investors to expect 1/3 of his investments to fail, 1/3 to return their capital (which is also failure; they sell for a small enough amount that investors just get their money back, and in most cases the founders and employees get nothing), and 1/3 to “succeed”, where his definition of success is that they return 5-10x the original investment.
He says his actual record is a bit better than that, but like Warren Buffet, he’d apparently rather set achievable expectations.
Let’s use some concrete examples. Remembering that most companies raise more than three rounds of funding, and keeping in mind that investors usually get about 20% of your company through each of those first few rounds, here’s what needs to happen to deliver that 10x return:
Your seed round is $500k at a $2.5m pre-money valuation, so you have to sell for $25m dollars. The investor gets $5m, and founders split $20m.
Your A round is $5m at a $25m pre-money valuation. Now your company has to sell for $250m. Each investor gets $50m, and the founders split $150m.
Your B round is $15m at a $75m valuation. Your target exit price is now almost $750m. By this time the founders own less than 50% of the company, but hey, if you can exit at that price everyone is pretty happy. Notice also that while this is a solid 10x win for the last investor here, it’s delivering close to a 300x return for the first investors (not counting pro rata costs). It’s nice work if you can get it.
Beyond three rounds, investors usually have smaller return expectations (e.g., 3-5x) but also have a shorter time horizon. That growth round investment of $50m is only expected to turn into $150m or so, but it needs to do it in 3-5 years instead of 7-10. Tripling a $750m valuation ends up being pretty hard in any time horizon.
It’s worth noting that if the company sells for $20m after that B round, then the founders get nothing. According to the preference stack (where the later investors all have priority over earlier ones), even with the cleanest term sheet the B and A investors get all their money back, but the seed investor, founders, and employees get nothing. In practice, the buyer will usually negotiate something for the employees and founders — you rarely buy a company without wanting some kind of golden handcuffs on the people who work there — but it’s basically a pittance. You’ve always got to manage your downside, even while you build toward the upside.
Note how quickly the exit price for the company escalates as you raise money. Realistically, it’s only once you’re around a billion dollars in valuation that you can consider going public, so if you’re smaller than that your only choice is to sell the company.
This model helps to explain the industry fetish for unicorns. The returns you get from a billion dollar exit swamp all the failures. And if those unicorns hide a lot of ills, the really big ones overwhelm even the successes. WhatsApp returned $3b to Sequoia on around $60m invested for a 50x return, which means every other investment in the portfolio could have failed and they’d have still made a ton of money.
You can see how the unicorns make or break a firm. How does this affect how they treat the rest of their portfolio?
When you know that a small percent of your bets end up mattering, you don’t worry much about any individual one, and that plays out in the world of venture capital.
Obviously investors don’t actually ignore the other firms; after all, they don’t really know which ones will win big. Equally, though, there’s no evidence they care whether any given startup succeeds.
Of course, investors would say otherwise: They’d say they work incredibly hard to help their companies, they work massive hours, answer the phone late at night, etc. Sure. I mean, they don’t put in nearly as many hours as the founders they’re helping, or even as much as a typical financier does (just thinking of the hours bankers put in these days makes me shudder) but I do believe they work hard. I do have a couple of anecdotes that show it’s not as hard as they’d imply, though.
I had one investor tell me that he loved the transition from operator to investor because the lifestyle is so much better. Again, this is from an investor class that publicly derides “lifestyle” businesses that generate cash for its founders but don’t scale massively. When I asked him about the hypocrisy of him working 9-5 but demanding his founders put in crazy hours, he defended it as their needing to lead from the front. Guess that tells you where the investors aren’t.
I also know a great investor who left a top-tier firm because he said he could not spend any more time working three days a week and being paid for five. Pretty honorable, if you ask me.
But mostly, yes, I do think many investors work hard.I just don’t think the work they’re doing helps their companies much.
Let’s walk through a couple of obvious examples.
Given the high probability of failure of a given investment, you’d think that the industry would be great at reducing the risks for their companies and thus increasing the survival rate. Not so much. For example, many investors have told me that the most likely reason for a company to fail is the team. Ok. So what do they do to reduce the probability that a founding team will fall apart?
Ah… nothing. No coach for each founder, no coaching plan, not even a packet providing best practices. Nada.
Their explanation for this is pretty simple: Coaches are expensive, and the investor can’t afford to have them on staff because the measly 2% on their $300m fund just can’t support bringing on staff to help founders. They could have the company fund it, but then that’s less money going to build the company.
This is the highest risk to your investment, and you’re literally not willing to spend any money mitigating it? Further, you’re tacitly recommending that your founders also avoid this easy bit of risk mitigation? Huh. Ok.
Investors will also tell you that the most valuable resource at a company is the founder’s time, and he or she needs to be laser-focused on building the business. It’s obvious they don’t actually believe that.
We’ve already established that founders will spend about a quarter of their time fundraising, rather than building the company. You could argue that this is the most valuable use of their time, but that’s only true in the sense that it has to be done and there’s no one else to do it. Most founders suck at fundraising and are tortured by their need to focus on that rather than building their business. Investors do help a little with this, but not so much that it implies the founder’s time actually is a precious resource. There’s a pretty clear sink-or-swim attitude around fundraising, even though success at it has little to do with the ability to build and run a company.
You see this same disregard for the founder’s time when you look at what they end up spending it on.
There’s a vanishingly small part of any business that’s truly innovative — maybe some part of your market definition or your solution itself — and everything else you do is disappointingly similar to what every other founder ends up doing. Great, so investors have figured that out and as part of their investment they deliver a playbook that uses the collective intelligence of their portfolio to help founders avoid having to make all the rookie mistakes, right? Hah! Nope!
The best firms do enable founders to talk and work together, but it’s all ad-hoc, and let’s be honest, that’s pretty minimal help. Every founder is basically doing a random walk around the possible solution space for “how to build a great company”, taking on huge technical risk with untried platforms and experimenting with idiocy like holacracy rather than focusing on the most important parts of their business, the one or two bets that will make or break the whole thing.
It shows how little investors are willing to do to help founders mitigate the biggest risks in their business, thus improving its probability of survival. If they cared about their portfolio companies making it, they’d specialize in helping them navigate the different phases of the company, minimizing probability of failure at each phase and especially when transitioning.
So now we see that it’s not just that investors are focused on unicorns, but also that the failure rate that those unicorns cover for is just irrelevant to investors. They know most of you will fail (again, they expect 2/3 to at best return their capital, which is failure in their model and even then only accomplished by a fire sale of the company). Heck, if you don’t fail and instead just continue on being neither a big sale nor a failure, they’ll have to push you into one or the other category in order to close their fund.
As I found running a growth company, success hides many ills. One of the biggest problems in venture capital is how much they let the success of their unicorns hide their indifference to the rest of their companies. This fails their founders, their employees, and the whole market, for no reason other than that it’s easier this way.
I’m convinced that a firm that directly invested in reducing its failure rate would have as many unicorns, but would also have more positive returns throughout their portfolio, and in the midst of building more companies and making more money, they just might do a little good at the same time. That would be a nice change.
The success of companies and founders in modern venture-backed startups is highly reliant on peer validation of investor decisions. Part 4 in a series.
Say you’re an entrepreneur building something new and different, and you know you need capital. After pitching up and down Sand Hill Road (and all over South Park), you’ve finally found a believer, someone who sees what you’re trying to do and thinks you and your team are the ones to do it. Great! Now you can focus on building your business, right?
Nope. Get used to more of the same. You probably raised just enough to get to your next milestone, not enough to get to self-sustaining profitability, which means you’ll be raising again soon. After all, on average startups raise more than three rounds of funding. I know what you’re thinking: But this investor is a true believer, and given how hard it was to convince others, they’ll sign up for the next round instead.
Nope. It does happen, but it’s rare. In general, every round you raise has to be led by a new investor. Part of this is about dollars: Your seed-stage investor writes $500k checks out of a $50m fund, but your A-round investor writes $5-10m checks out of a $300m fund. That seed investor will participate in the larger round (doing what’s called their pro rata, to keep their ownership share the same), but if they led the round they’d burn through their fund too quickly and would not be able to lead enough investments to make their model work.
Even if dollars aren’t the restriction on your first investor leading later rounds, you’ll still likely find yourself pounding the pavement again. Imagine you’re an investor, and you see a peer investor leads follow-on rounds for most of their portfolio companies. One of those companies comes knocking on your door asking you to invest, and of course your natural question is: Why isn’t your existing investor leading? There’s no good answer to that question.
You can’t say, “Well, they’re a bad investor, and I really need new blood”, for pretty obvious reasons. Even if it’s true, badmouthing existing investors will never get you new ones. You can’t say, “Well, they like us, but even though they lead follow-on rounds in 90% of their companies, they don’t like us enough to lead one for us.” You’ve just told this new investor that you’re in the bottom 10% of your investor’s portfolio. Now there’s no chance they’re going to invest. If the investor that knows you really really well doesn’t want to write a check, no one else will.
To prevent this problem, the industry has the habit of not leading follow-on rounds. Again, not that it never happens, but it can’t be the common pattern, because the company that breaks it gets a black mark. I’ve had many investors (including those invested in Puppet, the company I founded) tell me they follow this habit religiously, for exactly this reason. “Nope, as much as I like you, you’re going to have to get the money from someone else.”
Out you go.
Thankfully, venture investors recognize the downsides of this and build deep networks of firms and individuals who frequently work together. There are even later-stage firms who specialize in following specific investors whose track record they trust. But while this pattern was developed for good reasons, it also has downsides that no amount of networking or help can compensate for.
First, of course, it means most CEOs spend a huge percentage of their time either directly raising money or doing the work necessary to do so later. You might not have wanted to become best friends with tens of investors, but if you’re taking venture capital, that’s your job now. Given that investors are professional meeting-takers, they’ve got time to meet for coffee any time, so this can be hugely time consuming. Then when it comes time to actually raise a round, you should expect it to consume your life for at least three months. And that’s the success case.
This time sink is pretty bad if you live near all the investors you need to meet, but what if it’s a flight to the bay area instead of just a drive? Oh, if you’re one of the top companies they’ll come to you, but if you’re not, it’s one more way you have to work harder than the ones they love. It was only in our late-stage rounds we had luck getting investors to come to us, and we were only in Portland, an hour and a half flight away. I can’t imagine trying to raise money in a place that shudder needs a connecting flight to get to. I nearly killed myself in a rented PT Cruiser (the first available car at SFO) trying not to be late to an investor meeting, and of course, he passed on us anyway because I could not convince/did not want his buddy to join us as COO.
This all adds up to a massive tax on the companies that do succeed, where CEOs become experts in fundraising rather than experts in building great companies, which is, of course, stupid. But it has a much worse impact on who and what can get funding in the first place.
Again, put yourself in the head of an investor. You look at tens of potential investments a day, and you have far more opportunities than time or money, so you have your pick of what to invest in. On the one hand you’ve got a woman or a person of color pitching a company that sells to markets they deeply understand, maybe something more focused on customers who look like them. On the other hand, you’ve got a Harvard-educated CS grad who’s found another great use for AI in the cloud.
What we want is for the decision to be made based on what’s the best investment, who’s the best founder, but it’s not. It’s obviously not. If it were, you wouldn’t see such rank discrimination in the world of VC, where women and people of color are almost entirely excluded.
Instead, a key factor is whether the investor believes this person can raise another round. Note: It’s not whether the person actually can, because you don’t know that until you try it. It’s whether the investor thinks they can. And, of course, investors know that women and people of color don’t fit into the pattern of other investors, so they pre-discriminate in expectation that later investors would have anyway. I mean, why give someone $500k if the company won’t be able to raise another round anyway? You’ll lose all your money.
Like with all patterns, it’s as much about the company as it is about the founder. It’s not just about who gets money, it’s about what kinds of problems are worth solving, and what kinds of customers make good markets.
Silicon Valley has a well-known fondness for investing in products that solve the needs of white boys who just got out of college and are having to learn to live on their own, but less obvious is that this means they often consider other customers to be worthless. It is fantastically hard to convince an investor to back a product built for women, or people of color, or international buyers, when the investor is none of those things.
That is, it’s not just about investing in people who are different — it’s that their ideas are different, the problems they care about are different, and the markets they want to attack are different.
In a world where you’re taking risks, where you’re actually focused on brilliant founders in big markets, those differences would be positives, they’d be signs you can do something ground-breaking. But when that world requires multiple rounds of belief, where failure at any round destroys your company, suddenly those differences become reasons for people to say no, for companies not to get funding, for founders not to get support.
There are some firms out there, like K9 Ventures, who make these bets anyway and recognize that it turns their job into finding follow-on rounds for existing investments rather than just finding new companies. Too many investors either don’t see the consequences of this pattern, or preemptively admit defeat and just don’t even consider investing in a company that they are concerned couldn’t get another round.
Once again we see how a key aspect of venture, one that exists for good reasons, has pernicious consequences that help to explain how the world of venture works today, in all its glory and misery.
There’s no obvious fix to the problem, as either an investor or an entrepreneur, if you truly do need capital to grow but you don’t fit the pattern. One of your best defenses is to focus on profitability first, so you don’t need those follow on rounds and the levels of approval required to make them happen, but that’s not possible for every firm, and even when it is it can result in heavy compromises on growth.
Thankfully, there are now firms out there focusing on founders who are women and people of color. These firms will help in multiple ways. First, of course, they’ll provide the direct funding that is not currently available to so many great founders and companies, but second, they’ll begin to build out those networks of social proof that will enable these companies to get as many rounds as they need, rather than just the ones they can provide.
We’re going to need a lot more firms like that to truly unlock the potential of venture capital, to bring world-changing solutions to those who can get the most benefit, wherever they are and whoever they are. I’m hopeful that the competition these new firms bring will change the behavior, and the opportunity, of the existing ones enough to make the difference, but what’s really going to shift behavior is when the companies invested in by these companies start to deliver outsized returns specifically because they don’t fit the pattern.
Modern venture capital is obviously successful, as demonstrated by the fact that five of the world’s six largest companies were funded by it. However, success is as much about what you say ‘no’ to as what you say ‘yes’ to, and venture capital is no different. In addition to delivering massive collateral damage in the course of its work, the current model rejects all ideas that do not fit within its narrow definition of suitable.
The primary contributor to this wholesale rejection is how VC delivers returns, so to understand why it’s broken we must understand how it works. In this article we’ll go deep on how VCs get their money, how they turn that into more money, and what that all means in terms of what ideas they can and will back. Note that we’re focusing here on the ideas not the people; the structural biases against women and people of color will be discussed in later essays (but it’s worth recognizing that they’re just as baked into the model). Ross Beard’s The Innovation Blind Spot goes into great detail on this topic.
Venture capital firms generally have managers and limited partners; the managers are the people we think of as the investors (they sign the checks), and the limited partners are the investors in the firms; they’re “limited” in the sense that they have ownership but no real control. They don’t actually invest in firms; they invest in an individual fund, and all of the roles are built around the fund, not the firm. This is partially why you might seen an investor leave a firm but stay involved in investments from the old firm: the investor is still on that fund even if they’re not at the firm.
Most limited partners are very large financial institutions, like CalPERS, and they work with venture capital as part of a diversified investment strategy. They have pockets of money in all kinds of places, and VC is added in to ensure they have some high risk/high reward investments. These don’t necessarily even deliver better returns (and in general, VC as an asset class does not do that well), it’s there to get the right mix of risk in the portfolio. In most cases, the LPs are represented by people who would not fit in at a venture firm, because they’re usually finance people at governmental institutions.
A fund is raised by investors (“managing partners”, in this context) seeking money from high net worth individuals, institutions, and anyone else with a lot of money lying around. Money is committed for the life of the fund; except in rare cases there is only one way for an investor to get the money back.
One of the strange things about these funds is not just that they are planned to be locked into a fund for a long time, but it can be awkward if they aren’t. Limited partners invest with VCs as a means of putting money to work over something like a ten year period. If the money all gets returned quickly because of an exit, it throws off the spreadsheets and they quickly have to find somewhere else to put the money. This sounds silly, but it does have a real impact.
Venture capitalists then take this money, and use it to buy stock from startups. So now, the fund holds a bunch of stock instead of a bunch of money. Crucially, this stock is all in private companies, which means it’s generally illiquid (i.e., you can’t easily exchange it for cash). It’s also usually preferred stock, which means the investors get a few extra terms around control and how cash is distributed if there’s a below-value exit.
If this were a normal fund, there would be plenty of ways to make money, and the investors could deliver returns however they wanted; they could rely on growth, dividends, sales, or anything else. However, VC funds are limited partnerships with strict rules about what can be done with the money. No matter where you are in a fund cycle, if a company gets sold for cash, you have to distribute that cash to your investors (keeping 20% for yourself, of course). You can’t reinvest it in another company. (This is only generally true; firms that don’t have this restriction are called evergreen funds, and are usually funded by a single institution or family.)
This distribution on an exit is the primary mechanism for VCs to return capital to their investors. The other way is for a company to go public. This is a weirder one — it’s discussed as an exit, because it allows investors to return capital to their LPs, but it’s not a sale of the company. The difference is that the stock is now liquid, which means it’s basically equivalent to cash; the VCs give distribute the now-public shares to their LPs, who can now all trade it in for cash whenever they want.
Ironically, distributing shares to LPs is a big risk to the company — if 50% of a company’s stock is owned by investors, and they distribute all of that stock to their LPs the day a company’s lockup period ends, what do you think the LPs would do? Well, they’re not experts in tech, or high growth companies, and more importantly, this stock doesn’t fulfill the same needs as the VC fund did in their asset allocation, so they sell it. Of course. And what happens to a newly public company who finds that 50% of its shares are suddenly sold on the public market? The stock gets hammered, because a huge upsurge in supply means an equivalent drop in price.
That’s why VCs distribute shares over a broader period of time, usually 18-24 months. They have some flexibility in how this is handled so they can protect these newly-public companies.
Ok, now you understand how it all works — how venture capitalists get money, make money, and then give it back to their investors in turn. Why does that matter?
It matters because there are only two ways for a VC-backed startup to be a success for its investors: Go public or get bought. As the CEO of Puppet, I always said any company has four options: Go broke, go public, get bought, or stay private indefinitely. If you take VC money, that last option is off the table.
It’s worth saying again: You take VC, you are committing to getting bought, going public, or going broke.
Crucially, that means that investors must push you into one of those outcomes. The reason they deride private businesses that generate cash isn’t because they’re bad businesses, it’s because they’re structurally incapable of profiting off of them. Their system is limited to valuing sales or IPOs; nothing else can have value to them, because nothing else allows them to make money.
This means that if you’ve got a great company that’s taken some VC but is at real risk of settling into a mere 20% growth rate with a sight to profitability but only making, say, $30m a year, they’re going to push you out of that comfort zone. They have to. They’ll ask you to raise a “growth” round so you can “really scale this thing”, or they’ll try to sell the company. If that doesn’t work, they’ll just fire you and put someone in place who will do it for them. It’s not because they’re evil, it’s because their contracts essentially require it. They can’t return the stock of a private company to their LPs, so what choice do they have?
Now that we understand how investor behavior is driven by how capital is returned to investors, let’s discuss what it means to the technology startup ecosystem as a whole. (There are VCs for things outside of tech, but the asset class was basically invented for technology, and that’s where it is centered.)
If you’re seeking funding for your technology company, you essentially have to promise that you can and will sell your company for an outsized return, or that you can and will take it public. In reality, almost no one invests with the expectation of a sale; they’re all betting on an IPO, recognizing that a sale is a good second option. It doesn’t matter if you can generate a ton of profit; they have no use for that. In fact, it might get awkward if you started distributing dividends.
This has two big consequences. The first, of course, is that companies that don’t have a realistic shot of going public can’t get venture capital. This is a striking constraint, given how much of our economy consists of small, profit-generating businesses that generate jobs and cash locally, whereas the ranks of public companies that distribute returns only to the investment class have been shrinking for decades. The story they’ll tell you is that only those really high-growth companies “need” VC money, but it’s much simpler than that: Their business model doesn’t work if your company doesn’t sell or go public.
Bank loans do ok at providing funding for low-risk actions by mature companies, and VC does well at funding high-risk companies with the chance to be huge, but there’s a huge gap in the middle that struggles to get any funding. (Both of these funding mechanisms in the US also suffer from being overwhelmingly biased toward only funding white men, but that’s a different essay.) Medium-risk companies often do need funding, but can’t get it, which in many cases means the businesses either don’t exist or end up much smaller than they could be.
The second major consequence is that a lot of companies are able to convince themselves, and thus investors, that they could get big enough to go public. Yes, this is sometimes true, but in so many cases it is instead a lie that both parties tell in order to get the funding done. If you love your company, and the only way to keep it alive is to promise to keep growing, you will. You understand the risks, but they’re better than just letting your company die.
In too many cases, this absolute demand for continued growth is exactly what kills companies. They never learn the operating discipline necessary to generate cash (which, in the end, actually still is king), and they get too big to sustain themselves. At some point, the lie gets out, they can’t get more funding, the fundamental unsoundness of their business model becomes clear, and the whole thing deflates.
When you hear a VC say you should focus more on growth than cash, what they’re saying is, you should worry more about my ability to return capital to my investors than your ability to still have a company in a few years. It might be that growth is the right thing to invest in, but it isn’t automatically the right thing, and it’s at least fair to say that the investor is not a neutral party in this recommendation.
So now we see that so much of what we find poisonous in the world of venture capital is actually the result of how returns are distributed to investors. The growth-at-all-costs mentality, the huge amount of dead companies, pushing employees to work to the bone until you get an exit, and much more can be laid at the feet of this simple constraint.
I don’t know if there is an alternative model that will work in the world of high-risk tech startups, but I do know there are plenty of other investment models that are able to deliver returns without introducing this kind of dysfunction. Conglomerates like Berkshire Hathaway are able to own significant chunks — or even the entirety — of companies and deliver great returns whether via growth, dividends, or anything else. This provides them the flexibility to let their portfolio companies choose their own best means of returning capital to investors. Coincidentally, Berkshire Hathaway is the one non-VC-backed company in that list of six largest companies.
This essay series is an attempt to capture what I’m learning as I’m looking for a new way to invest in great startups. I think it’s possible to build an investment model that directly attacks the weaknesses of VC; success in this quest would mean both huge returns for whoever cracks it, but also a sudden increase in new companies with completely different promises and risk profiles.
Two decades into a software career, I’m still moved by its potential to improve people’s lives through connection, automation, and access to information, yet I’m less convinced than ever that our financial systems are built to get the most out of it.
This is the first post in a series I’ll be writing on the structural problems in venture capital. These problems aren’t a condemnation of the industry, they’re an attempt to outline where the industry fails the market. This failure helps to explain people’s experiences, but I think also helps to outline the opportunity and need for other ways of funding companies. These ways will also have flaws - they’ll likely not be great at building unicorns - but they’ll be finding people and markets ignored by the current environment.
Like the general financial industry, the world of venture capital has become adept at using money to create more money, but it does not consider of the wisdom of its actions. It chooses easy answers, thus leaving harder but better questions unexplored, and accepts high collateral damage to the employees, customers, and industry that at best is painful and at worst is pure exploitation.
I am pulled to build more software that, like Puppet, helps people get higher quality work done in less time and with more joy. But that kind of utopian phrasing is used by every company in silicon valley, whether they do advertising arbitrage or sell you pet food, all while asking their workers to work crushing hours for lottery pay, no safety net, and 19th century ideas of labor force participation. The devaluing of women and minorities as either workers or buyers is both discriminatory and bad business. It’s true I’ve heard no overt support for child labor, but I expect that’s mostly because kids don’t have CS degrees from Stanford or Harvard.
I believe it is possible to design a kind of financing vehicle that is less subject to these flaws. There is a lot of money to be made in enabling the whole market to participate in the technology economy, and given that productivity has stalled since 2004 (coincidentally around the time that social networks and attention-seeking advertising-driven business models took over), there’s a lot of opportunity to deliver value by increasing productivity.
The major concern about increasing productivity is that it generally means fewer jobs, and the lowest-skilled workers tend to be first and hardest hit. I do actually believe in reeducation and the movement of labor to new opportunities, but you can’t ignore the trauma of career changes and industry churn. My work at Puppet showed that empowering people at the front line is how you drive both change and value. Too many industries focus on getting rid of the experts at the coal face, when instead they should look to elevate them. This would improve productivity while developing careers, instead of destroying them.
Unfortunately, venture capital is structured to require trauma to everyone involved except the investors. Too often, even the limited partners who are the source of capital suffer, with only a few firms delivering the kind of returns that the asset class purports to offer. The industry is built around making many bets and expecting most to fail. Even worse, every company who wants to participate must make a claim to be able to reach these heights, even if they don’t believe it, and then they must risk their own death attempting to keep that promise.
The model itself requires that companies either go public or kill themselves. Nothing else fits in the spreadsheets. Again, this guarantees trauma to nearly everyone involved - even the ones who make it out suffer the whole way, leaving a trail of burned out employees and failed customers.
I think there are amazing companies waiting to be created that can deliver life-changing benefits but can realistically “only” generate $30m, or $50m, a year in revenue. At 25% margins for software, these can be huge sources of profit, but a venture capitalist would derisively call that a lifestyle business and either not fund it, or force it to kill itself in an attempt to scale beyond its natural size. These can be great businesses, but because business funding generally fits into either conservative bank loans, or 10x-oriented venture capital, there’s no model today that respects them. Jason Fried and DHH at Basecamp have doneatonofgreatwriting on this.
Jennifer Brandel, Mara Zapeda and others have launched the Zebra movement, focused on helping founders shut out of the VC world start companies that enrich themselves and their communities rather than their investors. I think this is an awesome effort, and has been an inspiration to me.
It’s true that this kind of company could not have as high a failure rate as venture capital does, but, ah, that’s not exactly complicated. I mean, VC literally requires failures of most of their companies, so I’ve got a nice anti-pattern to work against. There are well-worn practices for improving operations, people, and efficiency at even young businesses, but VCs haven’t bothered to invest in any of them, because again, they expect most everyone they work with to fail. Vista Equity, among many others, has shown that being more than dumb money can be more than just talk.
You might say there aren’t enough entrepreneurs out there, and all the great ones are focused on building unicorns in silicon valley. I say phooey. Tell that to the millions of people who start restaurants, corner shops, and franchises around the US. Frankly, tell that to all the people who pitched the valley but weren’t white men, or couldn’t afford to live in the bay area, and thus could not get funded. Because the valley itself refuses to believe great entrepreneurs can be women of color, or uneducated, or have a humanities degree, there is a long waiting list of great people ready to be given a little money and a little trust.
Silicon Valley today is baseball before Jackie Robinson, golf before Vijay Singh and Tiger Woods, tennis before Arthur Ashe and the Williams sisters. It’s the World Series with only North American teams, the World Championship game with only American athletes. It might do great things and be a great spectacle, but it’s weak sauce, because you know you’re not really competing with the best. In fact, you’ve structurally guaranteed you won’t, with all your stories of pipeline problems, lowering the bar, and various other grandfather clauses.
I do not believe in the primacy of ideas. I do not believe great entrepreneurs are in short supply. I do not believe we will run out of awesome opportunities in software in my lifetime.
I want to collect funding that will enable those unsupported entrepreneurs to reveal and develop their greatness, I want to build software companies in spaces that currently have no software, and I want to generate great returns for everyone involved without hemorrhaging people and money.
Yes, I know that means I have to find a different way to deliver returns to investors, because I don’t want my portfolio companies to have to sell. Yes, I know that means I will be creating a new asset class, with all the complications that entails around convincing LPs to invest in it.
The fact that others dismiss it out of hand for being impractical is exactly what excites me about it.
Please follow along in the rest of my series as I delve into the individual structural flaws in venture capital that I think outline what a competitive funding instrument must find a way around.
I’m a tech founder and recovering SysAdmin. I helped found DevOps and grew up in open source. These days I am convalescing from a decade of physical and mental neglect while running Puppet.
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A rendering of the structure of lactase
This huge structure is all necessary to enable the protein to place a lactose molecule near a water molecule in exactly the right arrangement to ensure the reaction happens immediately, every time, instead of eventually, sometimes. For all this structure, the site where the reaction takes place is quite small, just big enough for the two target molecules. Those 1927 amino acids mean the protein is about 37,000 atoms. Lactose is 35 atoms, and water is, ah, 3.
